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Firm Sponsored Training In Regulated Labor Markets: Evidence From Spain

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  • Carlos Peraita

    (Universitat de València)

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    Abstract

    Using data from the 1994 European Community Household Panel Survey, the author examines who receives formal firm-sponsored training in Spain. The author finds that the distribution of firm-sponsored training in the work force is uneven and concentrated among more skilled workers in the upper deciles of the wage distribution. The data show that the likelihood of receiving firm-sponsored training for a low education employee is dramatically reduced. Also, the better-educated employees in high wage occupations and industries of the largest establishments have higher probabilities of receiving specific training. Spain has a highly regulated labor market, and the labor market frictions and institutions compress and distort the structure of wages. However, the results suggest that training patterns observed in Spain reflect that highly compressed wage structure would not lead to more incentives of firms to invest in training. Este trabajo utiliza datos de la muestra española de la encuesta Panel de Hogares de la UniónEuropea (1994) para analizar las características del colectivo de trabajadores que reciben formaciónorganizada por sus empresas. Los resultados indican que la distribución de las inversiones enformación entre los trabajadores es muy desigual y se concentra entre los que poseen las mayorescualificaciones en las decilas superiores de la distribución de salarios. Los datos muestran que laprobabilidad de recibir formación en la empresa es muy reducida entre los empleados con menor nivelde educación. Igualmente, los empleados con nivel alto de educación, que trabajan en empresas congran número de trabajadores y en ocupaciones y sectores de actividad con elevados salarios, tienenprobabilidades elevadas de recibir formación. Por otro lado, España tiene un mercado de trabajo muyregulado y, además, las fricciones en el mercado de trabajo y sus instituciones comprimen ydistorsionan la estructura de salarios. Sin embargo, el comportamiento de las empresas en materia deformación observado en España sugiere que una estructura de salarios muy comprimida no tienenecesariamente que proporcionar mayores incentivos a las empresas para invertir en formación.

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    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasec/wpasec-2001-15.pdf
    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2001
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie EC with number 2001-15.

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    Length: 22 pages
    Date of creation: Jul 2001
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published by Ivie
    Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:2001-15

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    Related research

    Keywords: Formación organizada por la empresa; mercado de trabajo regulado; estructura de salarios comprimida. Firm-sponsored training; regulated labor market; wage compression.;

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    References

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    1. Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 2001. "Continuous training in Germany," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 523-548.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Steve Pischke, 1999. "Minimum Wages and On-the-Job Training," Working papers 99-25, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    3. John M. Barron & Mark C. Berger & Dan A. Black, 1997. "On-the-Job Training," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number ojt.
    4. Joseph G. Altonji & James R. Spletzer, 1991. "Worker characteristics, job characteristics, and the receipt of on-the-job training," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 45(1), pages 58-79, October.
    5. Nickell, Stephen & Bell, Brian, 1996. "Changes in the Distribution of Wages and Unemployment in OECD Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 302-08, May.
    6. Daron Acemoglu, 1998. "Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical Change And Wage Inequality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(4), pages 1055-1089, November.
    7. Dan A. Black & Brett J. Noel & Zheng Wang, 1999. "On-the-Job Training, Establishment Size, and Firm Size: Evidence for Economies of Scale in the Production of Human Capital," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 82-100, July.
    8. John M. Barron & Mark C. Berger & Dan A. Black, 1999. "Do Workers Pay for On-The-Job Training?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 34(2), pages 235-252.
    9. Steven McIntosh, 1999. "A cross-country comparison of the determinants of vocational training," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20213, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Lisa M Lynch & Sandra E Black, 2002. "Beyond the Incidence of Training: Evidence from a National Employers Survey," Working Papers 02-05, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    11. Peraita, Carlos, 2001. "Testing the Acemoglu-Pischke model in Spain," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 107-115, July.
    12. Booth, Alison L & Zoega, Gylfi, 2000. "Why Do Firms Invest in General Training? 'Good' Firms and 'Bad' Firms as a Source of Monopsony Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 2536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Stephen Nickell, 1997. "Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 55-74, Summer.
    14. Krueger, Alan & Rouse, Cecilia, 1998. "The Effect of Workplace Education on Earnings, Turnover, and Job Performance," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 61-94, January.
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