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Firms' Investments in General Training and the Market for Skilled Labour

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  • Anette Boom

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Abstract

An adverse selection model is analysed where firms can either train or hire a skilled worker. In equilibrium the market wage is determined by supply and demand. The quality of the supply of skilled labour is negatively biased because workers stem either from firms that shut down or from firms that observed their trainee's bad quality during the training. If less firms shut down this quality deteriorates and the incentive to train increases. The incentive is inefficient, because firms must share the informational rent and because they free-ride. Ex ante workers may wish to increase the firms' bargaining power

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Paper provided by Departmental Working Papers in its series Papers with number 013.

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Handle: RePEc:bef:lsbest:013

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  1. Euwals, Rob & Winkelmann, Rainer, 2001. "Why do Firms Train? Empirical Evidence on the First Labour Market Outcomes of Graduate Apprentices," CEPR Discussion Papers 2880, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. David H. Autor, 2000. "Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?," NBER Working Papers 7637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Acemoglu, Daron, 1997. "Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 445-64, July.
  4. Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 2002. "Minimum wages and on-the-job training," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20084, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Brunello, Giorgio & Medio, Alfredo, 2001. "An explanation of international differences in education and workplace training," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 307-322, February.
  6. Harhoff, Dietmar & Kane, Thomas J, 1996. "Is the German Apprenticeship System a Panacea for the US Labour Market?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1311, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Bassanini, Andrea & Booth, Alison L. & Brunello, Giorgio & De Paola, Maria & Leuven, Edwin, 2005. "Workplace Training in Europe," IZA Discussion Papers 1640, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Anke S. Kessler & Christoph Lülfesmann, 2006. "The Theory of Human Capital Revisited: on the Interaction of General and Specific Investments," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 903-923, October.
  9. Hans Gersbach & Armin Schmutzler, 2002. "A Product Market Theory of Worker Training," SOI - Working Papers 0214, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jan 2003.
  10. Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 9.
  11. Rainer Winkelmann, 1997. "How young workers get their training: A survey of Germany versus the United States," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 159-170.
  12. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1998. "The Structure of Wages and Investment in General Training," CEPR Discussion Papers 1833, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Booth, Alison L & Zoega, Gylfi, 2000. "Why Do Firms Invest in General Training? 'Good' Firms and 'Bad' Firms as a Source of Monopsony Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 2536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Lindner, Axel, 1998. "Modelling the German system of vocational education," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 411-423, December.
  16. Loewenstein, Mark A & Spletzer, James R, 1998. "Dividing the Costs and Returns to General Training," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 142-71, January.
  17. Katz, Eliakim & Ziderman, Adrian, 1990. "Investment in General Training: The Role of Information and Labour Mobility," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1147-58, December.
  18. Gary S. Becker, 1975. "Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education, 2nd ed," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck75-1, May.
  19. John M. Barron & Mark C. Berger & Dan A. Black, 1997. "On-the-Job Training," Books from Upjohn Press, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, number ojt.
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