The paper compares behavior in economic dictator game experiments played with actual money (amounts given by "dictator" subjects) with behavior in hypothetical dictator game experiments where subjects indicate what they would give, although no money is actually exchanged. The average amounts transferred in the two experiments are remarkably similar. Moreover, we uncover meaningful individual differences in real and hypothetical allocations and demonstrate the importance of two personality traits - agreeableness and extraversion - in reconciling them. We conclude that extraverts are "all talk;" agreeable subjects are "for real."
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Paper provided by Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus) in its series Working Papers with number
0305.
Length: Date of creation: Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hrr:papers:0305
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Avner Ben-Ner & Famin Kong & Louis Putterman & Dan Magan, .
"Reciprocity in a Two-Part Dictator Game,"
Working Papers
0902, Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus).
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