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Understanding the Nature of Cooperation Variability

Author

Listed:
  • Fosgaard, Toke

    (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Hansen , Lars Gårn

    (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Wengström, Erik

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

We investigate framing effects in a large-scale public good experiment. We measure indicators of explanations previously proposed in the literature, which when combined with the large sample, enable us to estimate a structural model of framing effects. The model captures potential causal effects and the behavioral heterogeneity of cooperation variability. We find that framing only has a small effect on the average level of cooperation but a substantial effect on behavioral heterogeneity and we show that this can be explained almost exclusively by a corresponding change in the heterogeneity of beliefs about other subjects’ behavior. Preferences are on the other hand stable between frames.

Suggested Citation

  • Fosgaard, Toke & Hansen , Lars Gårn & Wengström, Erik, 2013. "Understanding the Nature of Cooperation Variability," Working Papers 2013:6, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2013_006
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Framing; Public Goods; Internet Experiment; Simulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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