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An incentive-compatible Condorcet jury theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Unknown)

  • Jörgen W. Weibull

    (Unknown)

Abstract

We consider a group of individuals who face a binary collective decision. Each group member holds some private information, and all agree about what decision should be taken in each state of nature. However, the state is unknown, and members can differ in their valuations of the two types of mistakes that might occur, and in their prior beliefs about the true state. For a slightly randomized majority rule, we show that informative voting by all voters is the unique Nash equilibrium, that this equilibrium is strict, and that the Condorcet asymptotic efficiency result holds in this setting.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "An incentive-compatible Condorcet jury theorem," Post-Print hal-04302528, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04302528
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01734.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2008. "Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 655-683, May.
    2. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
    3. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
    4. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-1442, November.
    5. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ingela Alger & Jean-François Laslier, 2022. "Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: Coordination and information aggregation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(2), pages 280-312, April.
    2. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    3. Gabrielle Demange, 2018. "New electoral systems and old referendums," PSE Working Papers hal-01852206, HAL.
    4. Pan Addison & Fabrizi Simona & Lippert Steffen, 2018. "Non-Congruent Views about Signal Precision in Collective Decisions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-24, July.
    5. Herrade Igersheim & Antoinette Baujard & Jean-François Laslier, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," Working Papers halshs-01402275, HAL.
    6. Núñez, Matías & Pivato, Marcus, 2019. "Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 285-305.
    7. Igerseim, Herrade & Baujard, Antoinette & Laslier, Jean-François, 2016. "La question du vote. Expérimentations en laboratoire et In Situ," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 151-189, Mars-Juin.
    8. Jun Chen, 2021. "The Condorcet Jury Theorem with Information Acquisition," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(4), pages 1-33, October.
    9. Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim & Sağlam, Çağrı, 2013. "A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 422-430.
    10. Damien Bol & André Blais & Jean-François Laslier, 2018. "A mixed-utility theory of vote choice regret," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 461-478, September.
    11. Liu, Shuo, 2019. "Voting with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 694-719.

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