Implementation and Mind Control
AbstractThis paper incorporates social psychology into implementation theory, where an uninformed principal manipulates a dynamic decision-making process without employing any tailored contractual device. We demonstrate the principal's mind-control method through which he can effectively utilize social psychology tactics to incentivize informed agents to announce their information in keeping with his wishes. We show that with incentive compatibility, the principal can implement any alternative that he wishes as the unique Nash equilibrium outcome, even if the psychological cost of each agent from disobeying the principal's wishes is small as compared to his total material benefits.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-673.
Date of creation: Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033
Web page: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/index.html
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-10-24 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2009-10-24 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EVO-2009-10-24 (Evolutionary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October.
- Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006.
"Role of Honesty in Full Implementation,"
CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008.
"Behavioral aspects of implementation theory,"
Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
- Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CIRJE administrative office).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.