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Who wants the contrat de travail unique ? Social support for labour market flexibilisation in France

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  • Bruno Amable

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris 1 - Panthéon-Sorbonne, CEPREMAP - Centre pour la recherche économique et ses applications, IUF - Institut Universitaire de France - Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

A policy proposal is to abolish the distinction between regular open-end employment contracts and fixed-term contracts and substitute a unique labour contract with a degree of employment protection increasing with tenure. A question on the desirability of the "contrat unique" was included in the 2012 post-electoral survey. Using the answers to this question, this paper proposens an empirical analysis of the possible social basis for the contrat unique. Insider/outsider theories would predict that insiders would oppose such a reform whereas outsiders would welcome it. Beyond the theoretical and empirical problems associated with the definition and identification of insiders and outsiders, the results of the estimations do not bring an overwhelming support for the insider/outsider theories. The bulk of the social support for the CTU is made of "insiders". The social support for the contrat unique resembles the traditional social base of the Right with the addition of some "outsiders".

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00785640.

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Date of creation: Jan 2013
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00785640

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Keywords: Contrat unique/single labour contract; insider/outsider; political economy;

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  1. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1999. "The Political Economy of Employment Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers 2109, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Gilles Saint-Paul, 2004. "Why are European Countries Diverging in their Unemployment Experience?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(4), pages 49-68, Fall.
  3. Bruno Amable & Ken Mayhew, 2011. "Unemployment in the OECD," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(2), pages 207-220.
  4. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2000. "The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198293323.
  5. Dean Baker & Andrew Glyn & David Howell & John Schmitt, 2002. "Labor Market Institutions and Unemployment: A Critical Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence," SCEPA working paper series. SCEPA's main areas of research are macroeconomic policy, inequality and poverty, and globalization. 2002-17, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis (SCEPA), The New School.
  6. C Bean, 1992. "European Unemployment: A Survey," CEP Discussion Papers dp0071, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  7. Howell David R. & Baker Dean & Glyn Andrew & Schmitt John, 2007. "Are Protective Labor Market Institutions at the Root of Unemployment? A Critical Review of the Evidence," Capitalism and Society, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-73, May.
  8. Bruno Amable & Lilas Demmou & Donatella Gatti, 2011. "The effect of employment protection and product market regulation on labour market performance: substitution or complementarity?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(4), pages 449-464.
  9. Bell, David N.F. & Blanchflower, David G., 2011. "Young People and the Great Recession," IZA Discussion Papers 5674, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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Cited by:
  1. Guillaud, Elvire & Marx, Paul, 2013. "Preferences for Employment Protection and the Insider-Outsider Divide," IZA Discussion Papers 7569, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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