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Abstract

The application of the policies prescribed by the Washington Consensus in developing countries is the subject of a vast literature. What is much less known is that there exist only one pure laboratory experiment implementing the Washington Consensus in the western world: Europe. The aim of this paper is to show that Europe has gone very far in the internalisation of the Washington Consensus; in fact, it has devised constitutionally a form of government that has no choice but to implement it. What appears then clearly is that this attempt was not a success story.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE) in its series Documents de Travail de l'OFCE with number 2004-02.

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Length:
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in the "Initiative for Policy Dialogue Macroeconomics Companion Volume", edited by Shari Spiegel and Joseph E. Stiglitz
Handle: RePEc:fce:doctra:0402

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Related research

Keywords: Washington Consensus; Stability Pact; European Union; European Central Bank; Structural Reforms;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
• E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
• E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2004-02-15 (All new papers)
• NEP-HIS-2004-02-15 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
• NEP-MAC-2004-02-15 (Macroeconomics)

References

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Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:

1. The “Golden” Rule. Really? Golden?
   by Francesco Saraceno in Sparse Thoughts of a Gloomy European Economist on 2012-01-27 08:45:04
2. (Bad) Arguments Against Debt Monetization
   by Francesco Saraceno in Sparse Thoughts of a Gloomy European Economist on 2011-11-21 13:49:14
3. The “Golden” Rule. Really? Golden?
   by Francesco Saraceno in Sparse Thoughts of a Gloomy European Economist on 2012-01-27 08:45:04

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Cited by:

1. Canale, Rosaria Rita & Napolitano, Oreste, 2010. "The recessive attitude of EMU policies: reflections on the italian experience, 1998–2008," MPRA Paper 24705, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   
   • Canale, Rosaria Rita & Napolitano, Oreste, 2009. "The recessive attitude of EMU policies: reflections on the italian experience, 1998–2008," MPRA Paper 20207, University Library of Munich, Germany.
2. Massimo Cingolani, 2008. "Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy I. A Perspective From the Point of View of The Monetary Circuit," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 55(1), pages 89-114, March.
3. Rosaria Rita Canale, 2010. "Central Bank Reaction to Public Deficit and Sound Public Finance: The Case of the European Monetary Union," Journal of Advanced Studies in Finance, Association for Sustainable Education, Research and Science, vol. 0(1), pages 4-17, June.
   
   • Canale, Rosaria Rita, 2008. "Central bank reaction to public deficit and sound public finance: the case of the European Monetary Union," MPRA Paper 8789, University Library of Munich, Germany.
4. Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Francesco Saraceno, 2012. "European economic governance: the Berlin-Washington consensus," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2012-20, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
5. Mitchell, Wiliam & Muysken, Joan, 2006. "The Brussels-Frankfurt consensus: An answer to the wrong question," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-17177, Maastricht University.

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