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The Brussels-Frankfurt-Washington Consensus. Old and New Tradeoffs in Economics

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  • Jean-Paul Fitoussi

    (OFCE)

  • Francesco Saraceno

Abstract

The application of the policies prescribed by the Washington Consensus in developing countries is the subject of a vast literature. What is much less known is that there exist only one pure laboratory experiment implementing the Washington Consensus in the western world: Europe. The aim of this paper is to show that Europe has gone very far in the internalisation of the Washington Consensus; in fact, it has devised constitutionally a form of government that has no choice but to implement it. What appears then clearly is that this attempt was not a success story.

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Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number 2004-02.

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Date of creation: Feb 2004
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Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6761

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. The “Golden” Rule. Really? Golden?
    by Francesco Saraceno in Sparse Thoughts of a Gloomy European Economist on 2012-01-27 08:45:04
  2. (Bad) Arguments Against Debt Monetization
    by Francesco Saraceno in Sparse Thoughts of a Gloomy European Economist on 2011-11-21 13:49:14
  3. The “Golden” Rule. Really? Golden?
    by Francesco Saraceno in Sparse Thoughts of a Gloomy European Economist on 2012-01-27 08:45:04
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Cited by:
  1. Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Francesco Saraceno, 2012. "European economic governance the Berlin-Washington consensus," Sciences Po publications 2012-20, Sciences Po.
  2. Massimo Cingolani, 2008. "Full Employment as a Possible Objective for EU Policy I. A Perspective From the Point of View of The Monetary Circuit," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 55(1), pages 89-114, March.
  3. Rosaria Rita Canale, 2010. "Central Bank Reaction to Public Deficit and Sound Public Finance: The Case of the European Monetary Union," Journal of Advanced Studies in Finance, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(1), pages 4-17, June.
  4. Canale, Rosaria Rita & Napolitano, Oreste, 2009. "The recessive attitude of EMU policies: reflections on the italian experience, 1998–2008," MPRA Paper 20207, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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