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Assortative Matching and the Education Gap

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Abstract

This paper attempts to explain the decrease and reversal of the education gap between males and females. Given a continuum of agents, the education decisions are modelled as an assignment game with endogenous types. In the first stage agents choose their education level and in the second they participate in the labor and marriage markets. Competition among potential matches ensures that the efficient education levels can always be sustained in equilibrium, but there may be inefficient equilibria. Combining asymmetries intrinsic to the modelled markets the model reproduces the observed education gap. Classification-JEL Codes: C78, D13, D61

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Georgetown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number gueconwpa~06-06-12.

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Date of creation: 12 Jun 2006
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Handle: RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~06-06-12

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Postal: Georgetown University Department of Economics Washington, DC 20057-1036
Phone: 202-687-6074
Fax: 202-687-6102
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Web page: http://econ.georgetown.edu/

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Postal: Marcia Suss Administrative Officer Georgetown University Department of Economics Washington, DC 20057-1036
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Web: http://econ.georgetown.edu/

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Keywords: Assortative matching; pre-marital investments; efficiency;

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References

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  1. Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1998. "Efficient non-contractible investments," Staff Report 253, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Yoram Weiss & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2006. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," 2006 Meeting Papers 43, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Neil E. Gretsky & Joseph M. Ostroy & William R. Zame, 1990. "The Nonatomic Assignment Model," UCLA Economics Working Papers 605, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Cristina Echevarria & Antonio Merlo, 1995. "Gender differences in education in a dynamic household bargaining model," Staff Report 195, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Iyigun, Murat & Walsh, Randall P., 2005. "Building the Family Nest: Pre-Marital Investments, Marriage Markets and Spousal Allocations," IZA Discussion Papers 1752, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002. "Competing Premarital Investments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June.
  7. Harold L. Cole & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies," Penn CARESS Working Papers e9e0aca257b20d3bb6bb4a52a, Penn Economics Department.
  8. Jim Albrecht & Aico van Vuuren & Susan Vroman, 2007. "Counterfactual Distributions with Sample Selection Adjustments: Econometric Theory and an Application to the Netherlands," Working Papers gueconwpa~07-07-06, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  9. Fernández, Raquel & Guner, Nezih & Knowles, John, 2001. "Love and Money: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Household Sorting and Inequality," CEPR Discussion Papers 3040, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1777, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  11. Alejandro Badel & Ximena Peña, 2010. "Decomposing the GenderWage Gap with Sample Selection Adjustment: Evidence from Colombia," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 007725, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
  12. Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2006. "Assortative Matching and Reputation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1553, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  13. Albrecht, James & Björklund, Anders & Vroman, Susan, 2001. "Is There a Glass Ceiling in Sweden?," IZA Discussion Papers 282, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  14. José-Víctor Ríos-Rull & Virginia Sánchez-Marcos, 2002. "College Attainment of Women," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(4), pages 965-998, October.
  15. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz & Ilyana Kuziemko, 2006. "The Homecoming of American College Women: The Reversal of the College Gender Gap," NBER Working Papers 12139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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