Sharing a common resource with concave benefits
AbstractA group of agents enjoy concave and single-peak benefit functions from consuming a shared resource. They also value money (transfers). The resource is scarce in the sense that not everybody can consume its peak. The paper characterizes the unique (resource and money) allocation that is efficient, incentive compatible and equal-sharing individual rational. It can be implemented (i) by selling the resource or taxing extraction and redistributing the money collected equally, or (ii) by assigning property rights on equal shares in a competitive market. Next, the paper posits an allocation that is incentive compatible, individual rational and assigns to every agent no more than its peak benefit.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) in its series Working Papers with number 200601.
Date of creation: 2006
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COMMON RESOURCE; SINGLE PEAK; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; NO ENVY; FAIRNESS;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-22 (All new papers)
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