Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers
AbstractWe propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by o¤ering acqui- sition opportunities to successful managers. This allows ?rms to reduce performance- based compensation and can rationalize loss-making acquisitions. At the same time, takeovers remain a substitute for board dismissal in the replacement of poorly per- forming managers. The joint impact of the two mechanisms on managerial turnover is, however, multi-faceted: In ?rms with strong boards, turnover and performance- based pay are non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat. In ?rms with weak boards, turnover (performance-based pay) increases (decreases) with the in- tensity of the takeover threat. When choosing its acquisition policy and the quality of its board, each ?rm ignores the adverse e¤ect on other ?rms?acquisition oppor- tunities and takeover threat. As a result, the takeover market is not su¢ ciently liquid and too few takeovers occur.
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Date of creation: Nov 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- Burkart, Mike & Raff, Konrad, 2012. "Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 8794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-04-10 (Business Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2012-04-10 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2012-04-10 (Labour Economics)
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