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Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?

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Author Info
Cotter, James F.
Shivdasani, Anil
Zenner, Marc
Abstract

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBX-3SWV8XR-3/2/dae25615458c32cde327f2f97eae220c
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 43 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 195-218
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:43:y:1997:i:2:p:195-218

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

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  2. Elijah Brewer, III & William E. Jackson, III & Julapa A. Jagtiana, 2000. "Impact of independent directors and the regulatory environment on bank merger prices: evidence from takeover activity in the 1990s," Working Paper Series WP-00-31, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  3. Huizinga, Harry & Voget, Johannes & Wagner, Wolf, 2009. "International Taxation and Takeover Premiums in Cross-border M&As," CEPR Discussion Papers 7182, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Georges Dionne & Thouraya Triki, 2005. "Risk Management and Corporate Governance: the Importance of Independence and Financial Knowledge for the Board and the Audit Committee," Cahiers de recherche 0515, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  5. Roberto Di Pietra & Christos Grambovas & Ivana Raonic & Angelo Riccaboni, 2008. "The effects of board size and ‘busy’ directors on the market value of Italian companies," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 73-91, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Lisa Barrow & Cecilia Elena Rouse, 2000. "Using market valuation to assess the importance and efficiency of public school spending," Working Paper Series WP-00-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
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  7. David Yermack, 2006. "Board Members and Company Value," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 33-47, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Shams Pathan & Michael Skully & J. Wickramanayake, 2007. "Board Size, Independence and Performance: An Analysis of Thai Banks," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 211-227, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ivan Brick & N. Chidambaran, 2008. "Board monitoring, firm risk, and external regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 87-116, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein & Urs Peyer, 2006. "Lucky Directors," NBER Working Papers 12811, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Eliezer M. Fitch & Lawrence J. White, 2001. "Why Do CEO's Reciprocally Sit On Each Other's Boards?," Working Papers 01-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2001. "Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature," NBER Working Papers 8161, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Santella, Paolo & Drago, Carlo & Polo, Andrea & Gagliardi, Enrico, 2009. "A Comparison among the director networks in the main listed companies in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom," MPRA Paper 16397, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  14. Jayati Sarkar & Subrata Sarkar, 2005. "Multiple board appointments and firm performance in emerging economies: Evidence from India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2005-001, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India. [Downloadable!]
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  17. Santella, Paolo & Drago, Carlo & Polo, Andrea, 2007. "The Italian Chamber of Lords Sits on Listed Company Boards: An Empirical Analysis of Italian Listed Company Boards from 1998 to 2006," MPRA Paper 2265, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Felipe Balmaceda, 2006. "Mergers and CEO power," Documentos de Trabajo 224, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
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