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Why Do Managers Undertake Acquisitions? An Analysis of Internal and External Rewards for Acquisitiveness

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Author Info
Avery, Christopher
Chevalier, Judith A
Schaefer, Scott

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Abstract

We study the effect of a firm's acquisitions on the subsequent career of its chief executive officer (CEO) by examining a sample of executives who undertook large acquisitions between 1986 and 1988. We find that acquirers do not have significantly different compensation growth from executives who did not undertake acquisitions. Further, we find the effect of acquisitions on compensation does not depend on whether the acquisition increased shareholder wealth, nor on whether the acquisition was diversifying. We do find a benefit to acquisitions, however, because CEOs who completed acquisitions are significantly more likely to gain outside directorships than those who did not complete acquisitions. Our results do not support the argument that CEOs have an incentive to pursue acquisitions in order to increase their own compensation, but lend support to the argument that CEOs have an incentive to pursue acquisitions to increase their prestige and standing in the business community. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Journal of Law, Economics and Organization.

Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 24-43
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Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:24-43

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  1. Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, 2005. "Firm Expansion and CEO Pay," NBER Working Papers 11886, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Girma, Sourafel & Thompson, Steve & Wright, Peter, 2002. "Merger Activity and Executive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 3255, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Lili Qiu, 2004. "Which Institutional Investors Monitor? Evidence from Acquisition Activity," Working Papers 2004-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-24.


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