Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Central bank transparency and nonlinear learning dynamics

Contents:

Author Info

  • Stefano Eusepi

Abstract

Central bank communication plays an important role in shaping market participants' expectations. This paper studies a simple nonlinear model of monetary policy in which agents have incomplete information about the economic environment. It shows that agents' learning and the dynamics of the economy are heavily affected by central bank transparency about its policy rule. A central bank that does not communicate its rule can induce "learning equilibria" in which the economy alternates between periods of deflation coupled with low output and periods of high economic activity with excessive inflation. More generally, initial beliefs that are arbitrarily close to the inflation target equilibrium can result in complex economic dynamics, resulting in welfare-reducing fluctuations. On the contrary, central bank communication of policy rules helps stabilize expectations around the inflation target equilibrium.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr342.html
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr342.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 342.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:342

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045-0001
Email:
Web page: http://www.newyorkfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.ny.frb.org/rmaghome/staff_rp/

Related research

Keywords: Banks and banking; Central ; Monetary policy ; Inflation (Finance) ; Inflation targeting ; Disclosure of information;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. John C Williams & Athanasios Orphanides, 2005. "Robust Monetary Policy with Imperfect Knowledge," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 400, Society for Computational Economics.
  2. Jess Benhabib & Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2003. "Backward-looking interest-rate rules, interest-rate smoothing, and macroeconomic instability," Working Papers 03-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  3. Benhabib, Jess & Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie & Uribe, Martín, 2001. "Avoiding Liquidity Traps," CEPR Discussion Papers 2948, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Evans, George W & Guse, Eran & Honkapohja, Seppo, 2007. "Liquidity Traps, Learning and Stagnation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6355, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Benhabib, J. & Schmitt-Grohe, S. & Uribe, M., 1998. "Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria," Working Papers 98-02, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  6. James Bullard & Kaushik Mitra, 2002. "Learning about monetary policy rules," Working Papers 2000-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  7. Benhabib, Jess & Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie & Uribe, Martín, 1999. "The Perils of Taylor Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 2314, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Stefano Eusepi & Bruce Preston, 2007. "Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization," Discussion Papers 0708-10, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  9. Bennett T. McCallum, 2000. "Theoretical analysis regarding a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 870-935.
  10. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2008. "Expectations, Learning, And Monetary Policy: An Overview Of Recent Research," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 501, Central Bank of Chile.
  11. James Bullard, 1991. "Learning equilibria," Working Papers 1991-004, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  12. Marcet, A. & Nicolini, J.P., 1997. "Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning," Papers 9721, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
  13. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2004. "Policy Options in a Liquidity Trap," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 76-79, May.
  14. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2003. "Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof Way and Others," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 145-166, Fall.
  15. Bruce Preston, 2003. "Learning about monetary policy rules when long-horizon expectations matter," Working Paper 2003-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  16. Eusepi, Stefano, 2007. "Learnability and monetary policy: A global perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 1115-1131, May.
  17. Bullard, James & Cho, In-Koo, 2005. "Escapist policy rules," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1841-1865, November.
  18. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2003. "Policy Interaction, Expectations and the Liquidity Trap," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2003-33, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 06 Jul 2004.
  19. Evans, George W & Honkapohja, Seppo, 1995. "Local Convergence of Recursive Learning to Steady States and Cycles in Stochastic Nonlinear Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 195-206, January.
  20. Fabio Milani, 2005. "Expectations, Learning and Macroeconomic Persistence," Macroeconomics 0510022, EconWPA.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:342. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Amy Farber).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.