This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Central bank transparency and nonlinear learning dynamics

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Stefano Eusepi

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Central bank communication plays an important role in shaping market participants' expectations. This paper studies a simple nonlinear model of monetary policy in which agents have incomplete information about the economic environment. It shows that agents' learning and the dynamics of the economy are heavily affected by central bank transparency about its policy rule. A central bank that does not communicate its rule can induce "learning equilibria" in which the economy alternates between periods of deflation coupled with low output and periods of high economic activity with excessive inflation. More generally, initial beliefs that are arbitrarily close to the inflation target equilibrium can result in complex economic dynamics, resulting in welfare-reducing fluctuations. On the contrary, central bank communication of policy rules helps stabilize expectations around the inflation target equilibrium.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr342.html
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr342.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 342.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:342

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045-0001
Email:
Web page: http://www.newyorkfed.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.ny.frb.org/rmaghome/staff_rp/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).

Related research
Keywords: Banks and banking; Central ; Monetary policy ; Inflation (Finance) ; Inflation targeting ; Disclosure of information;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Evans, G.W. & Guse, E. & Honkapohja, S, 2007. "Liquidity Traps, Learning and Stagnation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0732, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. James Bullard & Kaushik Mitra, 2002. "Learning about monetary policy rules," Working Papers 2000-001, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Athanasios Orphanides & John C. Williams, 2007. "Robust monetary policy with imperfect knowledge," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2007-33, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2005. "Policy Interaction, Expectations and the Liquidity Trap," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 8(2), pages 303-323, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Jess Benhabib & Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2003. "Backward-looking interest-rate rules, interest-rate smoothing, and macroeconomic instability," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 1379-1423.
    Other versions:
  6. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof Way and Others," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 145-166, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Bullard James, 1994. "Learning Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 468-485, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Jess Benhabib & Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2001. "Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 167-186, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Jess Benhabib & Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2002. "Avoiding Liquidity Traps," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 535-563, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Bennett T. McCallum, 2000. "Theoretical analysis regarding a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 870-935.
    Other versions:
  11. Preston, Bruce, 2005. "Learning about Monetary Policy Rules when Long-Horizon Expectations Matter," MPRA Paper 830, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Bullard, James & Cho, In-Koo, 2005. "Escapist policy rules," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 29(11), pages 1841-1865, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Evans, George W & Honkapohja, Seppo, 1995. "Local Convergence of Recursive Learning to Steady States and Cycles in Stochastic Nonlinear Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 195-206, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Stefano Eusepi & Bruce Preston, 2007. "Central Bank Communication and Expectations Stabilization," Discussion Papers 0708-10, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Milani, Fabio, 2007. "Expectations, learning and macroeconomic persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(7), pages 2065-2082, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. George Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2008. " Expectations, Learning and Monetary Policy: An Overview of Recent Research," CDMA Working Paper Series 0802, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Albert Marcet & Juan P. Nicolini, 2003. "Recurrent Hyperinflations and Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1476-1498, December. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Benhabib, Jess & Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie & Uribe, Martín, 1999. "The Perils of Taylor Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 2314, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  19. Eusepi, Stefano, 2007. "Learnability and monetary policy: A global perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 1115-1131, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2004. "Policy Options in a Liquidity Trap," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 76-79, May. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.