Land Encroachment: India’s Disappearing Common Lands
AbstractOpportunistic land encroachment, resulting from costly and incomplete enforcement of common land boundaries, is a problem in many less-developed countries. A multi-period model of such encroachment is presented in this paper. The model accounts explicitly for the cumulative effects of non-compliance of regulations designed to protect a finite, non-renewable resource . in this case common land . from private expropriation. Gradual evolution of property rights from common to private . the consequence of encroachment . is demonstrated to be an equilibrium. To prevent the complete loss of common land, full enforcement must be the rule rather than the exception.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford in its series CSAE Working Paper Series with number 2004-28.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
enforcement; encroachment; dynamic optimisation; India;
Other versions of this item:
- Elizabeth Robinson, 2004. "Land Encroachment: India`s Disappearing Common Lands," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2004-28, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
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