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Land Encroachment: India’s Disappearing Common Lands

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  • Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson

Abstract

Opportunistic land encroachment, resulting from costly and incomplete enforcement of common land boundaries, is a problem in many less-developed countries. A multi-period model of such encroachment is presented in this paper. The model accounts explicitly for the cumulative effects of non-compliance of regulations designed to protect a finite, non-renewable resource . in this case common land . from private expropriation. Gradual evolution of property rights from common to private . the consequence of encroachment . is demonstrated to be an equilibrium. To prevent the complete loss of common land, full enforcement must be the rule rather than the exception.

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Paper provided by Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford in its series CSAE Working Paper Series with number 2004-28.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:csa:wpaper:2004-28

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Keywords: enforcement; encroachment; dynamic optimisation; India;

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  10. Feder, Gershon & Feeny, David, 1991. "Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 5(1), pages 135-53, January.
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  12. Clarke, Harry R. & Reed, William J. & Shrestha, Ram M., 1993. "Optimal enforcement of property rights on developing country forests subject to illegal logging," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 271-293, September.
  13. Leung, S.F., 1991. "How to Make the Fine Fit the Corporate Crime? An Analysis of Static and Dynamic Optimal Punishment Theories," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) 261, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  14. Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
  15. Arun S. Malik, 1990. "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 341-353, Autumn.
  16. Homans, Frances R. & Wilen, James E., 1997. "A Model of Regulated Open Access Resource Use," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Elizabeth Robinson & Heidi J. Albers & Jeffrey C. Williams, 2006. "Spatial and Temporal Modeling of Community Non-Timber Forest Extraction," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics WPS/2006-03, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

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