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Fisheries management and operations research

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  • Arnason, Ragnar

Abstract

Fisheries are subject to a deep-rooted problem of economic inefficiency, often referred to as the fisheries problem. The fisheries problem derives fundamentally from inappropriate social institutions controlling the fishing activity, the foremost of which is the common property arrangement. Fisheries management consists of replacing these institutions with more appropriate ones. Which institutions are most appropriate depends on the social objectives of the fisheries. There are strong economic arguments for the view that there should be only a single objective, namely to maximize the present value of the flow of benefits from the fisheries. In reality, different interest groups often push for several, often conflicting, objectives. In that case a multi-objective programming approach may be appropriate. A set of institutions to manage fisheries is referred to as the fisheries management regime. The fisheries management regime consists of a (i) fisheries management system, (ii) fisheries enforcement system and (iii) fisheries judicial system. Each one of these has to be appropriately designed and implemented. The efficacy of the overall fisheries management regime cannot be greater than that of its weakest link. At the same time it is of the greatest importance to keep an eye on the cost of fisheries management. Global evidence suggests that the cost of fisheries management often constitutes a substantial fraction of the value of the harvest. The problem, thus, is to strike the right balance between the efficacy of the fisheries management regime and its cost of design, implementation and operation. The problem of fisheries management is by its nature multidisciplinary. It involves marine ecology and biology, mathematics, economics, game theory, political science and anthropology to name a few. The problem is, moreover, typically quite complex, requiring powerful modelling and calculation techniques. In many respects this is the kind of problem operations research techniques are designed to deal with.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnason, Ragnar, 2009. "Fisheries management and operations research," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 193(3), pages 741-751, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:193:y:2009:i:3:p:741-751
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    3. van Dijk, Diana & Haijema, Rene & Hendrix, Eligius M.T. & Groeneveld, Rolf A. & van Ierland, Ekko C., 2013. "Fluctuating quota and management costs under multiannual adjustment of fish quota," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 265(C), pages 230-238.
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    7. Veronica Mpomwenda & Tumi Tómasson & Jón Geir Pétursson & Anthony Taabu-Munyaho & Herbert Nakiyende & Daði Mar Kristófersson, 2022. "Adaptation Strategies to a Changing Resource Base: Case of the Gillnet Nile Perch Fishery on Lake Victoria in Uganda," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(4), pages 1-20, February.
    8. Diana Dijk & Eligius M. T. Hendrix & Rene Haijema & Rolf A. Groeneveld & Ekko C. Ierland, 2017. "An Adjustment Restriction on Fish Quota: Resource Rents, Overcapacity and Recovery of Fish Stock," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(2), pages 203-230, June.
    9. Kvamsdal, Sturla F. & Maroto, José M. & Morán, Manuel & Sandal, Leif K., 2020. "Bioeconomic modeling of seasonal fisheries," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 281(2), pages 332-340.
    10. Guennady Ougolnitsky & Anatoly Usov, 2019. "Spatially Distributed Differential Game Theoretic Model of Fisheries," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 7(8), pages 1-13, August.
    11. Xepapadeas, Petros, 2023. "Multi-agent, multi-site resource allocation under quotas with a Stackelberg leader and network externalities," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    12. Ni, Yuanming & Sandal, Leif Kristoffer, 2019. "Seasonality matters: A multi-season, multi-state dynamic optimization in fisheries," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 275(2), pages 648-658.
    13. Rosas-Munoz, Juan & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz-Garcia, Felix, 2022. "Don't Leave the Regulator Alone in the Commons: How Fishing Cooperatives Can Help Ameliorate Inefficiencies," Working Papers 2022-1, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.

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