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Minimum Information Management in Fisheries

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  • Ragnar Arnason
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    Abstract

    This paper deals with problems of optimal management of common-property fisheries. It advances the proposition that many fisheries management schemes, which are theoretically capable of generating efficiency, are actually not practicable, owing to their huge informational requirements. This applies, for instance, to management by means of corrective taxes/subsidies. The paper proceeds to show that there exists, under fairly unrestrictive conditions, market-based management systems that require minimal information for their operation, but lead nevertheless to efficiency in common-property fisheries. One such system is the individual transferable share quota system.

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    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199008%2923%3A3%3C630%3AMIMIF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 23 (1990)
    Issue (Month): 3 (August)
    Pages: 630-53

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    Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:23:y:1990:i:3:p:630-53

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    Citations

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    Cited by:
    1. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2000. "Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case og Illegal Landings," Working Papers 9/00, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
    2. Frank Jensen, 2001. "Prices versus Quantities for Common Pool Resources," Working Papers 19/01, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
    3. Anderson, Christopher M. & Sutinen, Jon G., 2006. "The effect of initial lease periods on price discovery in laboratory tradable fishing allowance markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 164-180, October.
    4. Florian Diekert, 2012. "Growth Overfishing: The Race to Fish Extends to the Dimension of Size," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(4), pages 549-572, August.
    5. Arnason, Ragnar, 2009. "Fisheries management and operations research," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 193(3), pages 741-751, March.
    6. Kerr, Suzi & Sanchirico, James & Newell, Richard, 2002. "Fishing Quota Markets," Discussion Papers dp-02-20, Resources For the Future.
    7. Jensen, Frank, 2008. "Uncertainty and asymmetric information: An overview," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 89-103, January.
    8. Hatcher, Aaron, 2005. "Non-compliance and the quota price in an ITQ fishery," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 427-436, May.
    9. Sébastien Rouillon, 2012. "Decentralized Management of a Fishery," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 52(2), pages 181-193, June.
    10. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2013. "Formal and informal quota enforcement," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 191-215.
    11. Heaps, Terry, 2003. "The effects on welfare of the imposition of individual transferable quotas on a heterogeneous fishing fleet," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 557-576, November.
    12. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2004. "Fisheries Management with Multiple Market Failures," Working Papers 54/04, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
    13. Strydom, M.B. & Nieuwoudt, W. Lieb, 1998. "An Economic Analysis Of Restructuring The South African Hake Quota Market," Agrekon, Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA), vol. 37(3), September.
    14. Lone Grønbæk, 2000. "Fishery Economics and Game Theory," Working Papers 14/00, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
    15. Urs Steiner Brandt & Niels Vestergaard, 2006. "Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(4), pages 974-985.
    16. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
    17. Kjell Salvanes & Dale Squires, 1995. "Transferable quotas, enforcement costs and typical firms: An empirical application to the Norwegian trawler fleet," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, July.
    18. Hans Frost & Peder Andersen & Ayoe Hoff, 2013. "Management of Complex Fisheries: Lessons Learned from a Simulation Model," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 61(2), pages 283-307, 06.
    19. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2007. "Asymmetric information and uncertainty: The usefulness of logbooks as a regulation measure," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 815-827, September.
    20. Alvear, Santiago A. Bermeo, 2006. "Modelling an ITQ Scheme in the Galapagos Marine Reserve Spiny Lobster Fishery," 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand 31973, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    21. Alvear, Santiago A. Bermeo, 2006. "Modelling an ITQ Scheme in the Galapagos Marine Reserve Spiny Lobster Fishery," 2006 Conference, August 24-25, 2006, Nelson, New Zealand 31973, New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.

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