The Tradeoff of the Commons
AbstractWe develop a model of scarce, renewable resources to study the commons problem. We show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, property rights can often be less efficient than a commons. In particular, we study two effects: (1) waste which arises when individuals expend resources to use a resource unavailable due to congestion and (2) the risk of underutilization of the resource. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for each effect to dominate the other when the cost of determining the availability of a resource is low.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 26423.
Date of creation: 04 Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Tragedy of the Commons; Spectrum; Open Access; Appointments; Property Rights; Reservations;
Other versions of this item:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2010-11-13 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2010-11-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2010-11-13 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-IPR-2010-11-13 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2010-11-13 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Property rights and the tragedy of the commons
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-12-15 15:19:00
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R., 2013.
"Optimal allocation without transfer payments,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-20.
- Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R., 2006. "Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments," MPRA Paper 18481, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Mar 2009.
- Surajeet Chakravarty & Todd R. Kaplan, 2010. "Optimal Allocation without Transfer Payments," Discussion Papers 1004, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
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