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Buy or Wait, That is the Option. The Buyer’s Option in Sequential Laboratory Auctions

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Author Info
Philippe Fevrier ; Laurent Linnemer ; Michael Visser (Crest)

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Paper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2001-30.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2001-30

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Keywords: optimal matching;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Black, Jane & De Meza, David, 1992. "Systematic Price Differences between Successive Auctions Are No Anomaly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(4), pages 607-28, Winter.
  2. Gerard J. van den Berg & Jan C. van Ours & Menno P. Pradhan, 2001. "The Declining Price Anomaly in Dutch Dutch Rose Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1055-1062, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 2001. "Behavior in Multi-unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 413-54, March.
  4. Branco, Fernando, 1997. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An example," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 159-163, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Burns, Penny, 1985. "Market structure and buyer behaviour : Price adjustment in a multi-object progressive oral auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 275-300, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Philippe Février & William Roos & Michael Visser, 2005. "The Buyer's Option in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions: The Case of Wine Auctions at Drouot," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(4), pages 813-847, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Victor A. Ginsburgh, 1998. "Absentee Bidders and the Declining Price Anomaly in Wine Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1302-1331, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1993. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(419), pages 868-79, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 2005. "Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 170-207, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Robert J. Weber, 1981. "Multiple-Object Auctions," Discussion Papers 496, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  14. Claude Montmarquette & Jacques Robert, 1999. "Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demand: Theory, Experiments and Simulations," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-46, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Février Philippe & Roos William & Visser Michael, 2004. "The buyer's option in multi-unit ascending auctions : the case of wine auctions at Drouot," Research Unit Working Papers 0409, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Leufkens, Kasper & Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc, 2006. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An experimental analysis," Research Memoranda 040, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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