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Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions

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Kagel, John H.
Levin, Dan

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 53 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 170-207
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:53:y:2005:i:2:p:170-207

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Katerina Sherstyuk, 2002. "Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers 200207, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Indranil Chakraborty, 2004. "Multi-Unit Auctions with Synergy," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(8), pages 1-14. [Downloadable!]
  3. Février Philippe & Linnemer Laurent & Visser Michael, 2004. "Buy or wait, that is the option : the buyer's option in sequential laboratory auctions," Research Unit Working Papers 0410, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Leufkens Kasper & Peeters Ronald & Vorsatz Marc, 2006. "Sequential auctions with synergies: An experimental analysis," Research Memoranda 040, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  5. Katerina Sherstyuk, 2002. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Common Complementarities," Working Papers 200212, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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