Curbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentives
AbstractUsing data from a large, U.S. federal job training program, we investigate whether enrolment incentives that exogenously vary the ‘shadow prices’ for serving different demographic subgroups of clients influence case workers’ intake decisions. We show that case workers enroll more clients from subgroups whose shadow prices increase but select at the margin weaker-performing members from those subgroups. We conclude that enrolment incentives curb cream-skimming across subgroups leaving a residual potential for cream-skimming within a subgroup.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7121.
Date of creation: Jan 2009
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Other versions of this item:
- Courty, Pascal & Kim, Do Han & Marschke, Gerald, 2011. "Curbing cream-skimming: Evidence on enrolment incentives," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 643-655, October.
- Courty, Pascal & Kim, Do Han & Marschke, Gerald, 2008. "Curbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 3909, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Pascal Courty & Do Han Kim & Gerald Marschke1, 2009. "Curbing cream-skimming: Evidence on enrolment incentives," Economics Working Papers ECO2009/03, European University Institute.
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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