Empirical evidence suggests that parents with higher levels of education generally also attach a higher importance to the education of their children. This implies an intergenerational chain transmitting the attitude towards the formation of human capital from one generation to the next. We incorporate this intergenerational chain into an OLG-model with endogenous human capital formation. In absence of any state intervention such an economy might be characterized by multiple steady states. A temporary public investment into human capital formation is then needed for a transition from a steady state with low human capital levels to one with a higher human capital level. Furthermore, it can be shown that even the best steady state is suboptimal when the human capital is privately provided. This inefficiency can be overcome by a permanent public subsidy for education.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
5686.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
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Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1985.
"The Strategic Bequest Motive,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1045-76, December.
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Bernheim, B Douglas & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H, 1986.
"The Strategic Bequest Motive,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages S151-82, July.
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