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Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers

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  • Yang-Ming Chang

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Kansas State University)

  • Dennis L. Weisman

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Kansas State University)

Abstract

This paper develops a noncooperative Nash model in which two siblings compete for their parents' financial transfers. Treating sibling rivalry as a “rent-seeking contest” and using a Tullock-Skaperdas contest success function, we derive the conditions under which more financial resources are transferred to the sibling with lower earnings. We find that parental transfers are compensatory and that the family as an institution serves as an “income equalizer.” Within a sequential game framework, we characterize the endogeneity of parental transfers and link it to parents' income, altruism, and children's supply of merit goods (e.g., parent-child companionship or child services). We show that merit goods are subject to a “moral hazard” problem from the parents' perspective.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 71 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 821-836

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Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:71:4:y:2005:p:821-836

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  1. Cox, Donald & Rank, Mark R, 1992. "Inter-vivos Transfers and Intergenerational Exchange," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(2), pages 305-14, May.
  2. Konrad, K.A. & Junemund, H. & Lommerud, K.E. & Robledo, J.R., 2000. "Geography of the Family," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 2499, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
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  7. Robert Pollak, 2003. "Gary Becker's Contributions to Family and Household Economics," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 111-141, January.
  8. Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H. & Bernheim, B. Douglas, 1986. "The Strategic Bequest Motive," Scholarly Articles 3721794, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  9. Becker, Gary S, 1976. "Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 817-26, September.
  10. Stefan Hochguertel & Henry Ohlsson, 2009. "Compensatory inter vivos gifts," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(6), pages 993-1023.
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  12. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1988. "Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1165-82, December.
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  14. Lee Lillard & Robert Willis, 1997. "Motives for interqenerational transfers: Evidence from Malaysia," Demography, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 115-134, February.
  15. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
  16. Cox, Donald & Jakubson, George, 1995. "The connection between public transfers and private interfamily transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 129-167, May.
  17. Cox, Donald, 1987. "Motives for Private Income Transfers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(3), pages 508-46, June.
  18. Becker, Gary S, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1063-93, Nov.-Dec..
  19. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
  20. Chami, Ralph, 1998. "Private Income Transfers and Market Incentives," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(260), pages 557-80, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Yang-Ming Chang, 2007. "Transfers and bequests: a portfolio analysis in a Nash game," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 277-295, March.
  2. Bolin, Kristian & Lindgren, Björn, 2014. "Non-monotonic health behaviours - implications for individual health-related behaviour in a demand-for-health framework," Working Papers in Economics 588, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  3. Kristian Bolin & Bjorn Lindgren, 2012. "The Double Facetted Nature of Health Investments - Implications for Equilibrium and Stability in a Demand-for-Health Framework," NBER Working Papers 17789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Yang-Ming Chang, 2012. "Strategic transfers, redistributive fiscal policies, and family bonds: a micro-economic analysis," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 1481-1502, October.
  5. Goetghebuer, Tatiana & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2010. "Inheritance patterns in migration-prone communities of the Peruvian Highlands," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 71-87, September.
  6. Yang-Ming Chang, 2009. "Strategic altruistic transfers and rent seeking within the family," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 1081-1098, October.

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