The Truthful Signalling Hypothesis An Economic Approach
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 825.
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2002
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-12-17 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 480-94, July.
- Georg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2001. "Strategic Choice Handicaps when Females Pay the Cost of the Handicap," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse22_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- Michael Lachmann & Carl T. Bergstrom & Szabolcs Számadó, 2000. "The Death of Costly Signalling?," Working Papers 00-12-074, Santa Fe Institute.
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