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The Truthful Signalling Hypothesis: An Economic Approach

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  • Kjell Hausken
  • Jack Hirshleifer

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  • Kjell Hausken & Jack Hirshleifer, 2003. "The Truthful Signalling Hypothesis: An Economic Approach," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000808, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000808
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stergios Skaperdas, 1996. "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
    2. Michael Lachmann & Carl T. Bergstrom & Szabolcs Számadó, 2000. "The Death of Costly Signalling?," Working Papers 00-12-074, Santa Fe Institute.
    3. Neary, Hugh M, 1997. "Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 480-494, July.
    4. Nöldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Strategic Choice Handicaps when Females Pay the Cost of the Handicap," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 22/2001, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 251-276, June.
    2. Kjell Hausken, 2016. "Gordon Tullock: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 121-127, July.
    3. Kjell Hausken, 2006. "A General Equilibrium Model of Signaling and Exchange," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000001035, David K. Levine.

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