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Strategic Choice Handicaps when Females Pay the Cost of the Handicap

Author

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  • Nöldeke, Georg
  • Samuelson, Larry

Abstract

We examine a strategic-choice handicap model in which males send costly signals to advertise their quality to females. Females are concerned with the net viability of the male with whom they mate, where net viability is a function of the male's quality and signal. We identify circumstances in which a signaling equilibrium would require high-quality males to send signals so much larger than those of males in lower quality (to deter mimicry by the latter) as to yield lower net viabilities for the former. This causes females to shun males who send large signals, ensuring that there is no signaling equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Nöldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Strategic Choice Handicaps when Females Pay the Cost of the Handicap," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 22/2001, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bonedp:222001
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/78409/1/bgse22_2001.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Hausken, Kjell & Hirshleifer, Jack, 2008. "Truthful signalling, the heritability paradox, and the Malthusian equi-marginal principle," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 11-23.
    2. Kjell Hausken & Jack Hirshleifer, 2002. "The Truthful Signalling Hypothesis An Economic Approach," UCLA Economics Working Papers 825, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Hideaki Murase, 2004. "The Peacock'S Tail: Why Is An Extremist So Sexy?," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(3), pages 321-330, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    sexual selection; handicap principle; signaling equilibrium; net viability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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