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A General Equilibrium Model of Signaling and Exchange

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  • Kjell Hausken

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 618897000000001035.

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Date of creation: 20 Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000001035

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  1. John G. Riley, 1976. "Informational Equilibrium," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 071, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997. "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 118-156, March.
  3. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  4. Logren, Karl-Gustaf & Persson, Torsten & Weibull, Jorgen W, 2002. " Markets with Asymmetric Information: The Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(2), pages 195-211, June.
  5. Eric Alden Smith & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Costly Signaling and Cooperation," Working Papers, Santa Fe Institute 00-12-071, Santa Fe Institute.
  6. Kjell Hausken & Jack Hirshleifer, 2003. "The Truthful Signalling Hypothesis: An Economic Approach," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000808, David K. Levine.
  7. John G. Riley, 1974. "Competitive Signalling," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 050, UCLA Department of Economics.
  8. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
  9. Riley, John G, 2002. " Weak and Strong Signals," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(2), pages 213-36, June.
  10. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  11. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  12. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  13. Hirshleifer, Jack & Osborne, Evan, 2001. " Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 108(1-2), pages 169-95, July.
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