Male-Female Productivity Differentials: The Role of Ability and Incentives
Abstract
We consider the response to incentives as an explanation for productivity differences within a firm that paid its workers piece rates. We provide a framework within which observed productivity differences can be decomposed into two parts: one due to differences in ability and the other due to differences in the response to incentives. We apply this decomposition to male and female workers from a tree-planting firm in the province of British Columbia, Canada. We provide evidence that individuals do react differently to incentives. However, while the women in our sample reacted slightly more to incentives than did the men, the average difference is not statistically significant. The productivity differential that men enjoyed arose because of differences in ability, strength in our application. Nous étudions la réaction aux incitations pour expliquer les différences de productivité dans une entreprise qui paie ses travailleurs à la pièce. Nous développons un modèle dans lequel les différentiels de productivité peuvent être divisés en deux parties : une partie liée aux différences d'habilité et une autre aux différences quant aux réponses aux incitations. Nous appliquons cette distinction aux travailleurs (hommes et femmes) d'une entreprise de plantation d'arbres située en Colombie-Britannique. Nos résultats montrent que les individus sont hétérogènes quant à leur réponse aux incitations. Pourtant, bien que les femmes y réagissent sensiblement plus que les hommes, cette différence n'est pas statistiquement significative. Le différentiel de productivité apparaît seulement à cause des différences d'habilité, celle-ci étant représentée, dans notre étude, par la force physique.Download Info
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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2004s-17.Length:
Date of creation: 01 May 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2004s-17
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Keywords: Productivity; gender; compensation; incentives; productivité; genre; rémunération; incitations;Other versions of this item:
- Paarsch, Harry J. & Shearer, Bruce S., 2004. "Male-Female Productivity Differentials: the Role of Ability and Incentives," Cahiers de recherche 0401, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-05-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-IFN-2004-05-09 (International Finance)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Dubois, P. & Vukina, T., 2005.
"Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data,"
Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse)
200511, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2009. "Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents: Evidence from production contracts data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 489-500, July.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2006. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25568, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2006. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2005. "Optimal Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24645, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2008. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," IDEI Working Papers 393, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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