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Career Choice, Marriage-Timing, and the Attraction of Unequals

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  • Sylvain Dessy
  • Habiba Djebbari

Abstract

Both men and women wish to have a family and a rewarding career. In this paper, we show that the under-representation of women in high-powered professions may reflect a coordination failure in young women's marriage-timing decisions. Since investing in a high-powered career imposes time strain, it precludes early participation in the marriage market. Delayed participation in the marriage market has a higher cost for women than for men because women have shorter fecundity horizons. Marriage prospects of high-powered women depend on the marriage-timing decisions of younger women. Under these assumptions, we show that women's marriage-timing decisions exhibit strategic complementarities. Coordination failures in women's marriage-timing decisions lead to persisting gender differences in career choices. Yet, differential fecundity is only necessary, but not sufficient to obtain gender inequality in high-powered professions. We discuss social changes that solve the coordination failure while achieving a Pareto-improvement in the society at large.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0507.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0507

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Keywords: Marriage-timing; high-powered career; supermodular game; strategic complementarities; multiple equilibria; coordination failure;

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Cited by:
  1. Gillian Hamilton & Aloysius Siow, 2007. "Class, Gender and Marriage," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(4), pages 549-575, October.

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