Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data

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Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data

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Dubois, Pierre
Vukina, Tomislav

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Pierre Dubois

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 393.

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Date of creation: Dec 2008
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Publication status: Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n°4, juillet 2009, p. 489-552.[ Texte complet ]
Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:3384

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Article
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2009. "Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents: Evidence from production contracts data," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 489-500, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2006. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2006. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," 2006 Annual Meeting, August 12-18, 2006, Queensland, Australia 25568, International Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2005. "Optimal Incentives Under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24645, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
- Dubois, P. & Vukina, T., 2005. "Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200511, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-AGR-2006-06-24 (Agricultural Economics)
NEP-ALL-2006-06-24 (All new papers)
NEP-LAW-2006-06-24 (Law & Economics)
NEP-MIC-2006-06-24 (Microeconomics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Pierre Dubois & Tomislav Vukina, 2004. "Grower Risk Aversion and the Cost of Moral Hazard in Livestock Production Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 86(3), pages 835-841, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2003. "Grower Risk Aversion and the Cost of Moral Hazard in Livestock Production Contracts," IDEI Working Papers 248, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Paarsch, Harry J & Shearer, Bruce, 2000. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 59-92, February.
Other versions:
- Paarsch, Harry J. & Shearer, Bruce, 1996. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records," Cahiers de recherche 9623, Université Laval - Département d'économique. [Downloadable!]
- Paarsch, H-J & Shearer, B, 1996. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects : Statistical Evidence From Payroll Records," Papers 9623, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
- Harry J. Paarsch & Bruce S. Shearer, 1996. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-31, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Durand, Franck & Geoffard, Pierre-Yves, 1998. "Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 499-511, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Chiappori, P.A. & Durand, F. & Geoffard, P.Y., 1998. "Moral Hazard and the Demand for Physician Services: First Lessons from a French Natural Experiment," DELTA Working Papers 98-05, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
Pierre Dubois, . "Moral Hazard, Land Fertility and Sharecropping in a Rural Area of the Philippines," Working Papers 99-30, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dubois, Pierre, 2002. "Moral hazard, land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 35-64, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Armando Levy & Tomislav Vukina, 2002. "Optimal linear contracts with heterogeneous agents," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 29(2), pages 205-217, June.
Harry J. Paarsch & Bruce S. Shearer, 2004. "Male-Female Productivity Differentials: The Role of Ability and Incentives," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-17, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Paarsch, Harry J. & Shearer, Bruce S., 2004. "Male-Female Productivity Differentials: the Role of Ability and Incentives," Cahiers de recherche 0401, Université Laval - Département d'économique. [Downloadable!]
Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 92, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Papers 0096, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Ackerberg, D.A. & Botticini, M., 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Papers 96, Boston University - Department of Economics.
Martin, Laura L., 1997. "Production Contracts, Risk Shifting, And Relative Performance Payments In The Pork Industry," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(02), December. [Downloadable!]
Allen, Douglas & Lueck, Dean, 1992. "Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 397-426, October.
Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," 2004 Meeting Papers 316, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
Jaap H. Abbring & James J. Heckman & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard In Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 512-521, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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