Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data

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Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data

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DUBOIS, Pierre
VUKINA, Tomislav

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Pierre Dubois

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 393.

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Date of creation: Dec 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:3384

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Paper
- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2006. "Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Dubois, P. & Vukina, T., 2005. "Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200511, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse). [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-AGR-2006-06-24 (Agricultural Economics)
NEP-ALL-2006-06-24 (All new papers)
NEP-LAW-2006-06-24 (Law & Economics)
NEP-MIC-2006-06-24 (Microeconomics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Pierre Dubois & Tomislav Vukina, 2004. "Grower Risk Aversion and the Cost of Moral Hazard in Livestock Production Contracts," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, American Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 86(3), pages 835-841, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- DUBOIS, Pierre & VUKINA, Tomislav, 2003. "Grower Risk Aversion and the Cost of Moral Hazard in Livestock Production Contracts," IDEI Working Papers 248, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Durand, Franck & Geoffard, Pierre-Yves, 1998. "Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 499-511, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Chiappori, P.A. & Durand, F. & Geoffard, P.Y., 1998. "Moral Hazard and the Demand for Physician Services: First Lessons from a French Natural Experiment," DELTA Working Papers 98-05, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
Harry J. Paarsch & Bruce S. Shearer, 2004. "Male-Female Productivity Differentials: The Role of Ability and Incentives," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-17, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Paarsch, Harry J. & Shearer, Bruce S., 2004. "Male-Female Productivity Differentials: the Role of Ability and Incentives," Cahiers de recherche 0401, Université Laval - Département d'économique. [Downloadable!]
Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," 2004 Meeting Papers 316, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dubois, Pierre, 2002. "Moral hazard, land fertility and sharecropping in a rural area of the Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 35-64, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dubois, P., 1999. "Moral Hazard, Land Fertility and Sharecropping in a Rural Area of the Philippines," Papers 9930, Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques-.
Jaap H. Abbring & James J. Heckman & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard In Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 512-521, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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