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L'analyse de l'influence de la pression des pairs dans les équipes de travail

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  • David Masclet

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Abstract

This paper addresses the effects of peer pressure in work teams. Many empirical studies have shed light on the efficiency of peer pressure. Peer pressure can be defined as mechanisms of mutual monitoring and sanction established within a group of agents by the agents themselves in order to dissuade the members of the group from adopting a non-cooperative behavior. When work is organized in team production with profit sharing, theory predicts that compensing members of the team in proportion to the team's collective output provides a strong incentive to free ride on the efforts of others. However, because profits are shared, such structure also provide strong incentive to exert peer monitoring. Indeed a shirker do not reduce only his own payoff but also the payoff of every member of the team. We show in this paper that under some conditions, peer pressure increases cooperation. Cet article vise à étudier les conditions d'efficacité de la pression des pairs dans le cadre des équipes de travail. On définit la pression des pairs, comme l'ensemble de ces mécanismes de contrôle mais également de sanction mis en place par les agents eux-mêmes afin de discipliner leurs pairs. Lorsque le travail est organisé en équipe de production et qu'une partie du résultat est partagé entre les membres de l'équipe, chaque agent peut être incité à adopter un comportement de passager clandestin. Toutefois, alors que le partage des profits fournit aux agents des incitations fortes à adopter un comportement opportuniste, un tel mode de rémunération incite également au contrôle mutuel. En effet, le partage des profits peut inciter les agents à se contrôler mutuellement car la rémunération de chaque membre du groupe dépend non seulement de son propre effort mais également de celui des autres membres de l'équipe. On montre dans cet article que sous certaines conditions, la pression des pairs peut être une solution relative au problème du passager clandestin.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2003s-35.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2003s-35

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Keywords: peer pressure; peer monitoring; profit sharing; work incentives; free-riding; pression des pairs; contrôle mutuel; partage des profits; incitation à l'effort; passager clandestin;

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References

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  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
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  7. Lindbeck, Assar, 1997. "Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior," Seminar Papers, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies 622, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
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  16. Posner, Richard A. & Rasmusen, Eric B., 1999. "Creating and enforcing norms, with special reference to sanctions1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 369-382, September.
  17. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March.
  18. Posner, R.A. & Rasmusen, E., 1998. "Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions," Papers, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research 98-005, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  19. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1999. "Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal 100, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  20. Barron, John M & Gjerde, Kathy Paulson, 1997. "Peer Pressure in an Agency Relationship," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 234-54, April.
  21. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-72, June.
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