This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special Reference to Sanctions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Richard Posner (U.S.Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit)
Eric Rasmusen (Indiana University, Kelley School of Business)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Two central puzzles about social norms are how they are enforced and how they are created or modified. The sanctions for violation of a norm can be categorized as automatic, guilt, shame, informational, bilateral- costly, and multilateral-costly. Problems in creating and enforcing norms are related to which sanctions are employed. We use our analysis of enforcement and creation of norms to analyze the scope of feasible government action either to promote desirable norms or to repress undesirable ones.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/le/papers/9907/9907004.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Law and Economics with number 9907004.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 13 Jul 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwple:9907004

Note: Type of Document - Pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on ;
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords: norms; punishment; sanctions; ostracism; collective action problem;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
P00 - Economic Systems - - General - - - General
P50 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General
Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Dorothee Schmidt, 2005. "Morality and Conflicts," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2005_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marco Campenní & Giulia Andrighetto & Federico Cecconi & Rosaria Conte, 2009. "Normal = Normative? The role of intelligent agents in norm innovation," Mind and Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 8(2), pages 153-172, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. yamamura, eiji, 2007. "The effects of the social norm on cigarette consumption: evidence from Japan using panel data," MPRA Paper 10176, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Oscar J. Cacho & Graham R. Marshall & Mary Milne, 2003. "Smallholder Agroforestry Projects: Potential for carbon sequestration and poverty alleviation," Working Papers 03-06, Agricultural and Development Economics Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO - ESA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Abigail Barr, 2003. "Risk Pooling, Commitment and Information: An experimental test of two fundamental assumptions," Working Papers 2082, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
  6. Lars Feld & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2002. "Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. yamamura, eiji, 2006. "Automobile Safety Inspections and Enforcing Norms: Case Study of Japan Using Panel Data," MPRA Paper 10164, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. David Masclet, 2003. "L'analyse de l'influence de la pression des pairs dans les équipes de travail," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-35, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  9. Abigail Barr, 2003. "Risk Pooling, Commitment and Information: An experimental test of two fundamental assumptions," Framed Field Experiments 0006, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
  10. Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos & Francisco de Sousa Ramos, 2005. "Design De Contratos Pela Autoridade Antitruste: O Caso Do Mecanismo De Cessação De Práticas Anticompetitivas (Ccp)," Anais do XXXIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 33th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 094, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Springer Verlag was the first commercial publisher to be listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.