Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

What Norms Trigger Punishment

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jeffrey Carpenter

    ()

  • Peter Hans Matthews

    ()

Abstract

Many experiments have demonstrated the power of norm enforcement-peer monitoring and punishment-to maintain, or even increase, contributions in social dilemma settings, but little is known about the underlying norms that monitors use to make punishment decisions. Using a large sample of experimental data, we empirically recover the set of norms used most often by monitors and show ?rst that the decision to punish should be modeled separately from the decision of how much to punish. Second, we show that absolute norms often ?t the data better than the group average norm often assumed in related work. Third, we ?nd that di?erent norms seem to in?uence the decisions about punishing violators inside and outside one’s own group.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.middlebury.edu/services/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0708.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Middlebury College, Department of Economics in its series Middlebury College Working Paper Series with number 0708.

as in new window
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0708

Contact details of provider:

Related research

Keywords: public good; experiment; punishment; social norm; norm enforcement.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Masclet, D. & Noussair, C. & Tucker, S. & Villeval, M.C., 2001. "Monetary and Non-monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1141, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  2. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004. "Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 1337, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Poirier, Dale J., 1975. "On the use of bilinear splines in economics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 23-34, February.
  4. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Nikos Nikiforakis, 2004. "Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?," Experimental, EconWPA 0403001, EconWPA.
  6. Anderson, Patricia M & Meyer, Bruce D, 1997. "Unemployment Insurance Takeup Rates and the After-Tax Value of Benefits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 913-37, August.
  7. Nikos Nikiforakis & Hans-Theo Normann, 2008. "A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 358-369, December.
  8. Martin Sefton & Robert S. Shupp & James Walker, 2005. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers, Ball State University, Department of Economics 200504, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005.
  9. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "The demand for punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 522-542, April.
  10. Jeffrey Carpenter & Erika Seki, 2011. "Do Social Preferences Increase Productivity? Field Experimental Evidence From Fishermen In Toyama Bay," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(2), pages 612-630, 04.
  11. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert & Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2009. "Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 221-232, August.
  12. Ones, Umut & Putterman, Louis, 2007. "The ecology of collective action: A public goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 495-521, April.
  13. Nijman, T.E. & Verbeek, M.J.C.M., 1992. "Non-response in panel data: The impact on estimates of a life cycle consumption function," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-153282, Tilburg University.
  14. Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 1794, CESifo Group Munich.
  15. Marco Casari, 2005. "On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 107-115, June.
  16. Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2008. "Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 91-112, February.
  17. Kolm,Serge-Christophe, 2008. "Reciprocity," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521882651, 9.
  18. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Third-party punishment and social norms," Experimental, EconWPA 0409002, EconWPA.
  19. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 1347, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  20. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2006. "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 2106, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  21. Gächter, Simon & Herrmann, Benedikt, 2006. "The Limits of Self-Governance in the Presence of Spite: Experimental Evidence from Urban and Rural Russia," IZA Discussion Papers 2236, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  22. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2005. "Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?," IZA Discussion Papers 1583, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  23. Louis Putterman & Christopher M. Anderson, 2003. "Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Working Papers 2003-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  24. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December.
  25. Matthias Cinyabuguma & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2006. "Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-279, September.
  26. Falkinger, Josef, 1996. "Efficient private provision of public goods by rewarding deviations from average," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 413-422, November.
  27. Jon Elster, 1998. "Emotions and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 47-74, March.
  28. Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2010. "Norm Enforcement: The Role of Third Parties," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 239-258, June.
  29. Josef Falkinger & Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods - Experimental Evidence," IEW - Working Papers 003, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  30. Arhan Ertan & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2005. "Can Endogenously Chosen Institutions Mitigate the Free-Rider Problem and Reduce Perverse Punishment?," Working Papers 2005-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  31. R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas, 1984. "Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 113-149, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Jeffrey Carpenter & Shachar Kariv & Andrew Schotter, 2012. "Network architecture, cooperation and punishment in public good experiments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 93-118, September.
  2. Reuben, Ernesto & Riedl, Arno, 2009. "Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations," IZA Discussion Papers 4303, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Geoffrey Hodgson, 2014. "The evolution of morality and the end of economic man," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 83-106, January.
  4. Simon Halliday, 2011. "Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games," SALDRU Working Papers 62, Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town.
  5. Natalia Montinari, 2011. "The Dark Side of Reciprocity," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  6. Natalia Montinari, 2010. "Reciprocity in Teams: a Behavioral Explanation for Unpaid Overtime," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0114, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  7. Andreas Nicklisch & Irenaeus Wolff, 2009. "Cooperation norms in multiple-stage punishment," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_40, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  8. Leibbrandt, Andreas & López-Pérez, Raúl, 2012. "An exploration of third and second party punishment in ten simple games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 753-766.
  9. Bernd Irlenbusch & Janna Ter Meer, 2012. "Fooling the Nice Guys: The effect of lying about contributions on public good provision and punishment," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences 03-11, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
  10. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Kariv, Shachar & Schotter, Andrew, 2010. "Network Architecture and Mutual Monitoring in Public Goods Experiments," IZA Discussion Papers 5307, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  11. Donna Harris & Benedikt Herrmann, 2012. "When to Favour Your Own group? The Threats of Costly Punishments and In-group Favouritism," Economics Series Working Papers 628, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  12. Rockenbach, Bettina & Wolff, Irenaeus, 2009. "Institution design in social dilemmas: How to design if you must?," MPRA Paper 16922, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Weng, Qian & Carlsson, Fredrik, 2013. "Cooperation in teams: the role of identity, punishment and endowment distribution," Working Papers in Economics 551, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0708. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vijaya Wunnava).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.