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Can Endogenously Chosen Institutions Mitigate the Free-Rider Problem and Reduce Perverse Punishment?

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2005-13.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2005-13

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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  1. Umut Ones & Louis Putterman, 2004. "The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2004-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2006. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Caepr Working Papers, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington 2006-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006.
  3. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 0229r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  4. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
  5. Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2008. "Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(1-2), pages 91-112, February.
  6. Nikos Nikiforakis, 2004. "Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London 04/05, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Apr 2004.
  7. Casari, Marco & Plott, Charles R., 2003. "Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 217-247, June.
  8. Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, January.
  9. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Hideki Nakamura, 2001. "The 'Spite' Dilemma in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000155, David K. Levine.
  10. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  11. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Benoît Chalvignac, 2013. "Partnership and trust in gift-exchange games," Working Papers of BETA 2013-18, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  2. Julian Rauchdobler & Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2009. "Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 09-27, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  3. Noussair, C.N. & Tan, F., 2009. "Voting on Punishment Systems Within a Heterogeneous Group," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2009-19, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Pedro Dal Bo & Andrew Foster & Louis Putterman, 2007. "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2007-9, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2009. "What norms trigger punishment?," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 272-288, September.
  6. Oliver Bochet & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2002. "Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2002-29, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Ertan, Arhan & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2009. "Who to punish? Individual decisions and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(5), pages 495-511, July.
  8. Louis Putterman & Jean-Robert Tyran & Kenju Kamei, 2010. "Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 10-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  9. Annamaria Nese & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2009. "Individuals' Voting Choice and Cooperation in Repeated Social Dilemma Games," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena, University of Siena 025, University of Siena.
  10. Ones, Umut & Putterman, Louis, 2007. "The ecology of collective action: A public goods and sanctions experiment with controlled group formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 495-521, April.

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