Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?
AbstractRecent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating â€œperverseâ€ incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order â€œperverseâ€ punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced. Copyright Economic Science Association 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.
Volume (Year): 9 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888
Public goods; Collective action; Experiment; Punishment;
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