Indirect Social Sanctions from Monetarily Unaffected Strangers in a Public Good Game

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Indirect Social Sanctions from Monetarily Unaffected Strangers in a Public Good Game

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Mari Rege and Kjetil Telle () (Statistics Norway)

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Kjetil Telle

Abstract

Several economists have maintained that social sanctions can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates whether indirect social sanctions from monetarily unaffected observers can increase contributions to a public good. The experiment has two treatment effects. First, each participant's identity and contribution to the public good is revealed to the monetarily unaffected observers. Second, information affecting participants’ beliefs about the degree to which the observers are contributors is introduced. The data suggests that indirect social sanctions from monetarily unaffected observers can increase voluntary contributions to public goods, provided that the subjects have reason to believe that the observers themselves are strong contributors.

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Paper provided by Research Department of Statistics Norway in its series Discussion Papers with number 359.

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Date of creation: Oct 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:359

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2003-11-23 (All new papers)
NEP-CDM-2003-11-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
NEP-PBE-2003-11-23 (Public Economics)

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Cited by:
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Alexis Belianin & Marco Novarese, 2005. "Trust, communication and equlibrium behaviour in public goods," Experimental 0506001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

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