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Monitoring Costs in Chinese Agricutural Teams

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  • Dong, Xiao-yuan
  • Dow, Gregory K

Abstract

Large productivity gains have been observed in Chinese agriculture following the transition from collective farming to household contracting. Using a model of mutual monitoring in an egalitarian production team, the authors estimate that labor supervision absorbed about 10-20 percent of total labor time for a sample of Chinese agricultural teams during 1970-76. These agency costs are lower than comparable estimates derived from aggregate data. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 101 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 539-53

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:101:y:1993:i:3:p:539-53

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Cited by:
  1. Jeffery Carpenter & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2006. "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0608, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  2. Li, Haizheng & Zax, Jeffrey S., 2003. "Labor supply in urban China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 795-817, December.
  3. Joshua Herries & Daniel I. Rees & Jeffrey S. Zax, 2003. "Interdependence in worker productivity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 585-604.
  4. Li, Tianyou & Zhang, Junsen, 1998. "Returns to education under collective and household farming in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 307-335, August.
  5. Fertő, Imre, 2002. "A mezőgazdasági termelés szerkezetének változásai a fejlett országokban, I. Miért a családi gazdaság a meghatározó üzemforma a fejlett országok mezőgazdaságában?
    [Changes in the st
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 574-596.
  6. Ferto, Imre & Fogarasi, Jozsef, 2005. "The Choice of Farm Organisation. A Hungarian Case," 94th Seminar, April 9-10, 2005, Ashford, UK 24420, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  7. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2002. "Social Capital and Community Governance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 419-436, November.
  8. Carpenter, Jeffrey & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert & Hwang, Sung-Ha, 2009. "Strong reciprocity and team production: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 221-232, August.
  9. Zhang, Y., 2001. "Economics of transaction costs saving forestry," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 197-204, February.
  10. David Masclet, 2003. "L'analyse de l'influence de la pression des pairs dans les équipes de travail," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-35, CIRANO.
  11. Huang, Jikun & Rozelle, Scott & Martin, William J. & Liu, Yu, 2007. "Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in China," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 48478, World Bank.

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