Monitoring Costs in Chinese Agricutural Teams
AbstractLarge productivity gains have been observed in Chinese agriculture following the transition from collective farming to household contracting. Using a model of mutual monitoring in an egalitarian production team, the authors estimate that labor supervision absorbed about 10-20 percent of total labor time for a sample of Chinese agricultural teams during 1970-76. These agency costs are lower than comparable estimates derived from aggregate data. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 101 (1993)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/
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