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The grammar of institutions: The challenge of distinguishing between strategies, norms, and rules

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  • Achim Schlüter

    (Leibniz Center for Tropical Marine Ecology, Bremen, Germany, achim.schlueter@zmt-bremen.de)

  • Insa Theesfeld

    (Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), Germany)

Abstract

The grammar of institutions developed by Crawford and Ostrom presents a common syntax for analysing institutions and dismantles them into their components. This is a promising undertaking given the huge diversity of definitions of institutions, even within a single discipline. Additionally, the grammar opens a long existing black box regarding why individuals do or do not follow an institution. It differentiates between formal sanctions (‘or elses’ in the language of the grammar) which are already well analysed and more moral and emotion based factors (so called delta parameters). This process of differentiation is currently widely observed, particularly in economics. Recognising that it is a necessary step forward in analysing institutions, this paper analyses and develops the grammar: first, in relation to its syntactical clearness; and second, in relation to its particular emphasis on delta parameters as central elements for understanding the efficiency and effectiveness of institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Achim Schlüter & Insa Theesfeld, 2010. "The grammar of institutions: The challenge of distinguishing between strategies, norms, and rules," Rationality and Society, , vol. 22(4), pages 445-475, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:22:y:2010:i:4:p:445-475
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463110377299
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Saba Siddiki & Xavier Basurto & Christopher M. Weible, 2012. "Using the institutional grammar tool to understand regulatory compliance: The case of Colorado aquaculture," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 167-188, June.
    4. Maja Schl�ter & Alessandro Tavoni & Simon Levin, 2014. "Robustness of norm-driven cooperation in the commons to environmental variability," GRI Working Papers 146, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.

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