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Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from Continuous Time Laboratory Games

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  • Ryan Oprea
  • Keith Henwood
  • Daniel Friedman

Abstract

Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were matched in a two-population protocol with the same bimatrix, they showed clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the game. These findings support distinctive predictions of evolutionary game theory.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3129.

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Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3129

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Keywords: evolutionary dynamics; Hawk-Dove game; game theory; laboratory experiment; continuous time game;

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References

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  1. Cooper, Russell & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1993. "Forward Induction in the Battle-of-the-Sexes Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1303-16, December.
  2. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
  3. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C80-95, March.
  4. S. Huck & J. Oechssler, 1996. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach To Explaining Fair Allocations," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1996,13, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  5. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  6. Duffy, John & Feltovich, Nick, 2010. "Correlated equilibria, good and bad: an experimental study," SIRE Discussion Papers, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) 2010-123, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  7. Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(434), pages 1-25, January.
  8. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1989. "Communication in the Battle of the Sexes Game: Some Experimental Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(4), pages 568-587, Winter.
  9. Tibor Neugebauer & Anders Poulsen & Arthur J.H.C. Schram, 2002. "Fairness and Reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove Game," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 02-094/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  10. John Duffy & Nick Feltovich, 2008. "Correlated Equilibria, Good and Bad: An Experimental Study," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 358, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2008.
  11. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
  12. Dan Friedman, 2010. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 392, David K. Levine.
  13. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
  14. Daniel Friedman & Ryan Oprea, 2012. "A Continuous Dilemma," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 337-63, February.
  15. Smale, Stephen, 1976. "Exchange processes with price adjustment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 211-226, December.
  16. Ferguson, Adam, 1767. "An Essay on the History of Civil Society," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number ferguson1767.
  17. Van Huyck, John, et al, 1995. "On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Symmetric Bargaining Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 187-212.
  18. Dan Friedman, 2010. "Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results," Levine's Working Paper Archive 393, David K. Levine.
  19. repec:cdl:ucscec:1026613 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
  1. Bigoni, Maria & Casari, Marco & Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 2088, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  2. Dina Tasneem & Jim Engle-Warnick & Hassan Benchekroun, 2014. "An Experimental Study of a Common Property Renewable Resource Game in Continuous Time," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2014s-09, CIRANO.
  3. Michael Funke & Yu-Fu Chen & Aaron Mehrota, 2011. "Global warming and extreme events: Rethinking the timing and intensity of environment policy," Quantitative Macroeconomics Working Papers, Hamburg University, Department of Economics 21105, Hamburg University, Department of Economics.
  4. Chen, Yu-Fu & Funke, Michael, 2010. "Global Warming And Extreme Events: Rethinking The Timing And Intensity Of Environmental Policy," SIRE Discussion Papers, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) 2010-48, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).

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