Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests
AbstractWe consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University in its series Working Papers with number 2011-28.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Faculty of Social Sciences, Bar Ilan University 52900 Ramat-Gan
Phone: Phone: +972-3-5318345
Web page: http://econ.biu.ac.il
More information through EDIRC
Contests; rent seeking; public good; easy-riding.;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Epstein, Gil S., 2012. "Employer's Information and Promotion-Seeking Activities," IZA Discussion Papers 7023, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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