Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gil S. Epstein

    () (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Yosef Mealem
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://econ.biu.ac.il/files/economics/working-papers/2011-28.pdf
    File Function: Working paper
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University in its series Working Papers with number 2011-28.

    as in new window
    Length: 26 pages
    Date of creation: Nov 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2011-28

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Faculty of Social Sciences, Bar Ilan University 52900 Ramat-Gan
    Phone: Phone: +972-3-5318345
    Fax: +972-3-7384034
    Email:
    Web page: http://econ.biu.ac.il
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Contests; rent seeking; public good; easy-riding.;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2008. "Rent-seeking, Spillovers and the Benefits of Decentralization," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
    2. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 739-71, May.
    3. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, September.
    4. Gil S. Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2002. "Political Culture and Monopoly Price Determination," CESifo Working Paper Series 646, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2005. "Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2005.16, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
    6. Timothy N. Cason & Roman M. Sheremeta & Jingjing Zhang, 2010. "Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games," IEW - Working Papers 505, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, revised Feb 2012.
    7. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2004. "Strategic restraint in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 201-210, February.
    8. Gil Epstein & Shmuel Nitzan, 2006. "Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 447-453, June.
    9. Kyung Baik, 2008. "Contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 103-117, January.
    10. Andreas Leibbrandt & Lauri Sääksvuori, 2010. "More than Words: Communication in Intergroup Conflicts," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-065, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2011-28

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Department of Economics).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.