Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 139 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Contests; Rent seeking; Public good; Heterogeneity; Free-riding; Orchestration of interest groups; D72; C72; H41;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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