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Everyone is a winner: Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition

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  • Reuben, Ernesto
  • Tyran, Jean-Robert

Abstract

We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent, and therefore it does not eliminate equilibria where all groups cooperate at an equal but low level. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if the incentive to compete is sharp.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 26 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 25-35

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:1:p:25-35

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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Keywords: Intergroup competition Cooperation Public goods Experiment;

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Cited by:
  1. Hattori, Keisuke, 2011. "A Note on Within-group Cooperation and Between-group Interaction in the Private Provision of Public Goods," MPRA Paper 32045, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Markussen, Thomas & Reuben, Ernesto & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2012. "Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice," IZA Discussion Papers 6620, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Kato, Takao & Shu, Pian, 2011. "Competition, Group Identity, and Social Networks in the Workplace: Evidence from a Chinese Textile Firm," IZA Discussion Papers 6219, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Guillen, Pablo & Merrett, Danielle & Slonim, Robert, 2013. "A new solution for the moral hazard problem in team production," Working Papers, University of Sydney, School of Economics 2013-19, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
  5. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2011. "Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests," Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2011-28, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  6. Julian Rauchdobler & Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2009. "Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 2896, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Heinrich Ursprung, 2011. "The Evolution of Sharing Rules in Rent Seeking Contests: Incentives Crowd Out Cooperation," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2011-02, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  8. Johannes Weisser, 2011. "Leading by example in intergroup competition: An experimental approach," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2011-067, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.

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