Employer's Information and Promotion-Seeking Activities
AbstractThis paper presents a model in which promotion of employees within the internal firm hierarchy is determined by the individuals' allocation of time between promotion/rent-seeking and productive activity. We consider the effect of an increase in the employer's knowledge (information) regarding the employees' productivity levels on the total time spent by the workers in non-productive promotion-seeking activities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 7023.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Economics and Business Letters, 2012, 1(4), 21-32
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-12-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2012-12-22 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2012-12-22 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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