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Group Specific Public Goods, Orchestration of Interest Groups and Free Riding

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Author Info

  • Gil S. Epstein

    ()
    (Bar Ilan University,Israel and CReAM, London, IZA, Bonn)

  • Yosef Mealem

    (Netanya Academic College, Netanya, Israel)

Abstract

We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are decreasing as reflected in the contest success function. In the first part of the paper we show conditions under which freeriding decreases and consider the different properties of the equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we develop the properties of the optimal formation of the group and its affect on the equilibrium outcome.

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File URL: http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/2009-02/2009-02.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University in its series Working Papers with number 2009-02.

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Date of creation: Feb 2009
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Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-02

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Postal: Faculty of Social Sciences, Bar Ilan University 52900 Ramat-Gan
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Web page: http://econ.biu.ac.il
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Related research

Keywords: Contests; rent seeking; public good; heterogeneity; free-riding; orchestration of interest groups;

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Cited by:
  1. Gil S. Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2011. "Cooperation and Effort in Group Contests," Working Papers 2011-28, Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University.
  2. Shmuel Nitzan & Kaoru Ueda, 2013. "Intra-Group Heterogeneity in Collective Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4096, CESifo Group Munich.

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