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Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

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Author Info
Murat Atlamaz
Bettina Klaus ()

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Abstract

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 598.04.

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Length: 16
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:598.04

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Related research
Keywords: Hiding-proofness; destruction-proofness; transfer-proofness; exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible objects.;

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D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 1998. "Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 297-311. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 677-690, May.
  5. Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 1997. "Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 305-333. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro & Flip Klijn & Estela S?chez, 2003. "Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 561.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  7. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 255-62, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Sertel, Murat R. & Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2002. "Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-83, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Somdeb Lahiri, 2005. "Manipulation via Endowments in a Market with Profit Maximizing Agents," Game Theory and Information 0511008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lahiri, Somdeb, 2008. "Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments," MPRA Paper 10026, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Dimitrov,Dinko & Haake,Claus-Jochen & Klaus,Bettina, 2005. "Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," Research Memoranda 027, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Vendrik, Maarten & Woltjer, Geert, 2006. "Happiness and Loss Aversion: When Social Participation Dominates Comparision," Research Memoranda 027, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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