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Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences

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  • Agustín Bonifacio

Abstract

We study reallocation rules in the context of a one-good economy consisting of agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their characteristics (preferences or endowments) in order that each agent is better off after an appropriate redistribution of what the rule reallocates to the group, adjusted by the resource surplus or deficit they all engage in by misreporting endowments. First, we characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, (preference and endowment) strategy-proof and weakly replacement monotonic rules, extending the result due to Massó and Neme (Games Econ Behav 61: 331–343, 2007 ) to our broader framework. Second, we present a full description of the family of bribe-proof rules that in addition are individually rational and peak-only. Finally, we provide two further characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule involving bribe-proofness. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Agustín Bonifacio, 2015. "Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(3), pages 617-638, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:44:y:2015:i:3:p:617-638
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0849-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomson, William, 1997. "The Replacement Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 145-168, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Agustín G. Bonifacio, 2024. "Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(2), pages 345-365, March.
    2. Takuma Wakayama, 2017. "Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(2), pages 357-385, August.
    3. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Takuma Wakayama, 2021. "Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(3), pages 773-785, September.
    4. Dietzenbacher, Bas & Tamura, Yuki, 2023. "Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    5. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.

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