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Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

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Author Info
Carmen Herrero () (Department of Economics, Universidad de Alicante)
Ricardo Martinez () (Department of Economics, Universidad de Alicante & Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)

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Abstract

We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents' preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, fair and non-manipulable solutions. We refer to such a family as M-temporary satisfaction methods. Besides, we provide arguments to defend these methods as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called uniform rule.

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File URL: http://www.upo.es/serv/bib/wps/econ0629.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía in its series Working Papers with number 06.29.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pab:wpaper:06.29

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Related research
Keywords: Allocation problem indivisibilities single-peaked preferences standard of comparison temporary satisfaction methods.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 511-520. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Youngsub Chun, 1999. "Equivalence of Axioms for Bankruptcy Problems," Working Paper Series no1, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
  4. Dagan, Nir, 1996. "A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 255-261, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Carmen Herrero Blanco & Ricardo Martínez, 2004. "Egalitarian Rules In Claims Problems With Indivisible Goods," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-20, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  6. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Carmen Herrero, 2002. "General allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: path-independence and related topics," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 19-40. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Carmen Herrero & Ricardo Martinez, 2006. "Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked," Working Papers 06.30, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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