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Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

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  • Dimitrov,Dinko
  • Haake,Claus-Jochen
  • Klaus,Bettina

    (METEOR)

Abstract

We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents'' preferences are additive, no such rule exists.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 027.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2005027

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Keywords: microeconomics ;

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  1. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2005. "Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Working Papers 367, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  2. Murat Sertel, 2000. "Manipulability of the Men-(Women) Optimal Matching Rule via Endowments," Departmental Working Papers 0014, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
  3. Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 677-690, May.
  4. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 255-62, April.
  5. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
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