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Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

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  • Murat Atlamaz

    ()

  • Bettina Klaus

    ()

Abstract

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-006-0159-2
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 28 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-18

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:1-18

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References

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  1. Klaus,B. & Peters,H. & Storcken,T., 1995. "Reallocation of an infinetely divisible good," Research Memorandum 012, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
  3. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro & Flip Klijn & Estela S?chez, 2003. "Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 561.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  4. Bettina Klaus & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 1998. "Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 297-311.
  5. Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Strategy-Proofness and Essentially Single-Valued Cores," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 677-690, May.
  6. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 255-62, April.
  7. Murat Sertel, 2000. "Manipulability of the Men-(Women) Optimal Matching Rule via Endowments," Departmental Working Papers 0014, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
  8. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Luis Corchón & Matteo Triossi, 2008. "Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent," Documentos de Trabajo 255, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  2. Lahiri, Somdeb, 2008. "Manipulation of market equilibrium via endowments," MPRA Paper 10026, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. S. Akin & Brennan Platt & Murat Sertel, 2011. "The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 147-162, June.
  4. Doruk İriş & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2011. "Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 2952-2958.
  5. William Thomson, 2009. "Borrowing-proofness," RCER Working Papers 545, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  6. Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2005. "Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Working Papers 367, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  7. Somdeb Lahiri, 2005. "Manipulation via Endowments in a Market with Profit Maximizing Agents," Game Theory and Information 0511008, EconWPA.

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